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Sport and Politics - Danish-German Sport Collaboration during World War II
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After the enforced break due to the riots of the Admira soccer match in Copenhagen in June 1941, the Danish and German authorities were so concerned about the events of the Admira game being repeated that around 50 security officers were brought in for a boxing tournament in Copenhagen on 8 October 1941. However, Danish–German sporting relations got underway again, even with national team matches going on in Germany and matches with other Axis-power countries. Most notable was an international soccer match in Dresden in November. Gradually, as Germany began running into military difficulties, there was less and less interest, in the words of propaganda minister Goebbels, of seeing Germans losing to weaker nations.

**Keywords** sport, politics, collaboration

It is a good thing that straight backs were found among the leadership of the Danish Sports Federation, led first and foremost by ‘the old General’ H. Castenschiold and his clever, fearless comrade Leo Frederiksen. Because when the Germans came to Denmark, there was no end to Tschammer’s belief in how wonderful times would be for the sporting youth of Denmark together with Hitler’s youth. But Leo – The Lion – was a master at finding all sorts of excuses to not taking part in collaborative events. (Idorn 1971, *Dansk Idræts-Forbund’s Jubilæumsskrift*, 207: interview with the sports journalist Julius Larsen)

**Introduction**

How closely connected are sport and politics? The period during the German occupation of Denmark (9 April 1940–4 May 1945) can throw a surprising light over this question, because the characteristics of a phenomenon are often shown best when it is under pressure. We can gain an insight into sport’s potentially explosive force in situations of conflict, when the key question is whether sport should contribute to the improvement of democratic citizenship or instead be tried out embedded in a superiority cult. In those historical periods when Danish sports leaders have been busiest in reassuring that sport is
apolitical, it has been perhaps precisely to erase the impression of its enormous political importance, not least during a period of occupation.

It is part of the common ideology of modern national and international sporting federations in the West that sport and politics are neatly separated spheres, that the federations should autonomously administer their sports, organize competitions and sporting events in a national and international context, and that governments should beware of interfering with the organizations’ autonomy in sporting matters. The separation of sports from politics was seen by the founding fathers and pioneers of international sports federations as one precondition for the successful promotion of international competitions and their growth in scope. History has, however, shown that it was difficult to live up to this expectation when dictatorial regimes realized the potential of modern sports for mobilizing masses, and sought to make use of this potential for their own ends that is as a means to entertain (and distract) people, to promote adherence to the regime, to export its ideology and to compete internationally for its respectability. All this is by no means a mere historical problem which dates back to the time of Fascist and Communist dictatorships and their aspirations from 1917/18 to 1989, quite on the contrary: it remains a question of ongoing actuality, as is well illustrated by the recent debates on the Popular Republic of China as host of the Summer Olympic Games in 2008.

When the slogan that sport – not least in the form of mega events such as the Olympic Games – has nothing to do with politics is time and again emphasized, it may be because elite sport and politics on the contrary are intimately related. Phrases about sport’s non-political nature is a defence, the main aim of which is preventing elite sports from being dragged down into profane political everyday life, where it would lose its magic touch. The word ‘politics’ is derived from the Greek word for a city-state, ‘polis’, which meant a town and the surrounding areas that could provide enough food for the urban population. To be ‘political’ in the ancient Greek sense meant to fight for your city-state. In this way, modern elite sport could be said to be political per se since one of the main aims is to gain honour and emotionally integrate the inhabitants of a city, a region or a nation in an imagined community.

Sport is here analysed from the perspective of cultural propaganda. Peter Beck’s *Scoring for Britain* has been inspirational in showing that democracies also tend to use sport for cultural and nationalistic propaganda, although not in such a direct manner as the totalitarian states. In this article, both the nationalistic focus of the Danish public opinion and the use of German sport as political propaganda are being investigated. It is my basic assumption that the national euphoria of democratic nations within the field of sport to a large extent makes them blind to the exposure of cultural propaganda by totalitarian states.

Sport is all but absent from Danish historical works on the period of occupation, despite the capacity sport had to forge emotional bonds around people’s souls like no other social phenomena. The period of occupation is the most well-researched period in Danish history. The same source material has been examined back and forth, and it might easily be imagined that no stone had been left unturned. However, new sources and new perspectives still arise. Sport, too, is a region that fascinates many people. It is therefore surprising that until the last few years these two fields have never been seriously brought together in publications covering Danish sport during the occupation.
The grey zone that Denmark found itself in during the occupation has meant that Danish collaborative action has been interpreted in varying ways. Therefore, a short summary will be undertaken of the research traditions concerning Danish collaboration with the occupying powers. At the outbreak of World War II on 1 September 1939, the Danish government declared Denmark’s neutrality, which was a continuation of the security policy that the country had followed since 1935, where Denmark refrained from taking sides in disagreements between the great powers. With the German occupation of Denmark on 9 April 1940, the German ambassador to Denmark (later the plenipotentiary), Cecil von Renthe-Fink, handed over a memorandum to the Danish Government, in which Germany demanded unconditional surrender and de facto suzerainty, but which at the same time gave reassurances that Denmark could maintain its territorial integrity and political independence. Relations with Germany thereafter were coloured by the Danish Government’s attempt to maintain the fiction of neutrality. Collaboration between Denmark and the occupying forces, therefore, would be put into effect through the Danish foreign ministry, as between two sovereign nations. Denmark placed itself into a grey zone between being a neutral country and being an enforced German ally, which led to political and economic collaboration with the occupying forces. The rationale behind this ‘peace occupation’ was the recognition that Denmark did not have the faintest chance of offering military resistance or defending its territorial borders. A collaboration policy with the occupying forces, therefore, was regarded as being the only measure by which the Danish Government could retain as much power as possible in Danish hands.

The collaborative policy was realistic and legitimate seen against the background that, up until the occupation, it had proved impossible to create defensive alliances with democratic countries such as Great Britain and Sweden. The policy of collaboration was at best a protection for the Danish people, because it shielded the population against Nazification, terror, hunger, blitzkrieg against Danish cities and the hunting down of Danish Jews. We can only try to imagine what a purely Nazi administration of Denmark could have come up with to solve ‘the Jewish problem’, as it did in the Netherlands. At the same time, there is not much to indicate that the Germans would have gained more from simply plundering Denmark.

This does not mean, however, that an uninhibited and opportunistic appeasement of German power was called for. That the occupation is a period of such existential importance, also for later Danish generations, is directly related to the way that keeping close company with the occupiers brought with it a long series of trials of civil courage where it was difficult to draw the line at the right place. The collaborative policy was a grey zone that could quickly turn black, a slippery slope where an initially chilly disposition could develop into an active accommodation of the rulers’ wishes, even before the German authorities had formulated them. It was not legitimate to sell military hardware to German representatives and certainly not to develop the assortment of destructive weapons. Nor was it legitimate to send back escaping Jews to Germany. But this was not a direct consequence of Danish collaborative policy but rather the result of a zealous application of a strict rule which has its origins far back in the traditions of Danish administration. In short, we can remain strongly critical about how the collaboration policy was handled by Danish authorities, organizations and individuals, without denouncing the policy as such.
After Germany embarked upon the Second World War in September 1939, the Danish Sports Federation, in contrast to its corresponding organizations in Sweden and Norway, and with the support of the Danish Foreign Ministry, continued to meet German sportsmen and -women on the sporting field. Shortly after the German occupation of Denmark on 9 April 1940, the top leadership of the Danish Sports Federation (DIF) decided to abstain from competitions against foreign nations. The reason was anxiety that holding highly emotional football matches so shortly after Denmark had been occupied would bring Danish sporting tempers to boiling point and thereby ruin future opportunities for international sporting relations.

Nevertheless, at the beginning of the occupation, sport turned out to be the cultural activity that the German authorities showed greatest commitment to resuming. This meant that Danish sport could retain its autonomy and its principle of representative democracy as long as the Danish sport leaders cooperated with the Germans. Furthermore, sport matches between the two countries were still the common task of the German and the Danish sport federations without direct involvement. The German authorities were enthusiastic about re-establishing sporting relations because Denmark was defined as an Aryan-Germanic region and it would be beneficial to incorporate the country within the Fatherland. Other countries – especially those in Eastern Europe – were never given the same opportunity for large-scale sporting relations but were instead brutally treated as nations of inferior people. In addition, there was the propaganda effect of providing sports entertainment for the German people, demonstrating German surplus capacity for competitive sports at a time of war.

The situation of the Danish ‘peace occupation’ by Germany means that we can study the German sports propaganda policy in its clearest form. Other occupied nations like Holland and Norway ended up in a situation where they were governed by internal allies of the German Nazis, and international sports exchange in the great scale was impossible because of the risk of revolt among the many nationally oriented spectators that would be gathering to watch athletic confrontation with teams from the Axis powers. Norway and Holland fought against the Germans but were quickly defeated. In Norway, a Sports Führer was appointed and an attempt was made to organize the whole of Norwegian sport according to the Führer principle. The Norwegian sports leaders reacted by calling for a ‘sports strike’ and sport exchange with Germany therefore became very limited. The German occupying authorities in Holland did not undertake international games in that country, despite the Dutch people, in line with Danes, being considered to be racially matched with Germany – although there was a measure of exchange through the participation of Dutch women swimmers at competitions in Germany. The German Reich Sports Führer von Tscharmer und Osten had argued that no Dutch–German international matches should be held in Holland since they might ‘bring the tempers of the Dutch supporters to boil, so they turn to political demonstration’. As a rule, the German authorities did not intervene in the internal organization of Dutch sports that continued at full tilt, since the attitude of the appointed Reich Commissioner, Arthur Seyss-Inquart, was ‘those who compete in sports do not sin’. Dutch sporting associations were encouraged, however, to set up a single comprehensive federation, which continues to the present; while the decisive German intervention was that participation by Jewish sportspeople was outlawed. Over the course of 1941, Dutch Jews were removed from community life and a ban against Jewish participation in sport did not bring forth any great protest from other sporting circles.
The German authorities, on the other hand, considered Denmark to be a secure zone where the occupying power could show the occupied and the rest of the world that they would allow defeated people to a free and flourishing exchange of sports based on fair play, and that they could administer this while they were in the midst of a full-scale war. Hitler and Goebbels wanted to use open-air concerts, military parades and sporting events in Denmark to encourage a Danish mindset favourable towards friendly relations with Germany. Sport, with its emotional appeal, had a much stronger chance of reaching the Danes at a grass-roots level than the more official and formalized cultural activities of ballet, theatre and academic exchange. Therefore, the first German plenipotentiary (former ambassador to Denmark) Cecil von Renthe-Fink put pressure on the Danish sporting authorities, and he was eventually seconded by the Danish Foreign Ministry. Erik Scavenius, who was appointed as Danish Minister for Foreign Affairs on 8 July 1940, regarded sport as a suitable instrument for achieving German goodwill, thereby enabling the general collaborative policy with Germany to run smoothly. At the same time, organizations within DIF became more and more interested in resuming sporting relations with the outside world in order to gain economically from international matches and to stimulate the Danish athletes’ level of competition.

At the end of April 1940, despite a DIF-initiated ban on international matches, the powerful football boss Leo Frederiksen entered into a covert agreement with the German football leadership designed to kick-start sporting relations with an international football match against Germany in the autumn of that year. After Germany forced the capitulation of Belgium, Holland and France through its blitzkrieg of May and June 1940, the leadership of Danish sports adapted itself to getting international sporting relations up and running again. It seemed that Europe was about to experience a generation of German dominance, and for DIF the aim became to survive with as much autonomy as possible in Europe under the new order.

These opening moves led to an agreement reached with Renthe-Fink on 5 August that sporting relations should be resumed and that a group of international football matches be held involving German and Swedish teams; allowing the Danish public to realise there was no question of a one-sided collaboration with the occupying power. Sport became one of the most important avenues of communication over the Danish–Swedish Sound during the occupation, and Danish sport was in contact with its Swedish sister nation very early (and remained very late), ending with a tennis match against Sweden in January 1944.

The collaboration by Danish sporting organizations with the occupying powers became far more widespread than has been publicly known until now. In the relatively short period from the first games on 22 August 1940 until the last match against a Hungarian team – an international handball match on 22 November 1942 – a wealth of international matches, inter-city matches, tournaments, games and series were held, where especially the boxing and wrestling associations together with the athletics association were active as organizers. There were international matches against Germany in football, handball, boxing and wrestling – all at least twice – as well as in weightlifting, fencing and hockey. International matches were also held against other Axis-alliance countries, such as against Italy in tennis, Hungary in athletics and Croatia in wrestling. The first years of the occupation became a golden age of Danish–German collaborative sports that was far more intense than during any period before or since.
Intense collaborative sporting relations continued until the summer of 1941. Then, at a match against a Viennese team, SK Admira Wien – on the very day commemorating the Danish Constitution, Grundlovsdag – Admira demonstrated German superiority by beating a select team from Copenhagen 4–1. The Danish supporters, including some young members of the Danish Communist Party who had planned to protest against the Germans during the game, quite simply dropped the business of sporting relations – pouring scorn on the political gestures of the guests and humiliating off-duty but uniformed German soldiers among the crowd with verbal and physical assaults. Their tactics worked so well that the German supporters drew bayonets, and both Germans and Danes needed hospital treatment.

Renthe-Fink did not regard the disturbance as simply frustration at a sporting defeat, but ascribed to it serious political signals. To calm Renthe-Fink’s anger, the chairman of the Danish Football Federation (DBU) Leo Frederiksen assured him that it was morally defective elements among the crowd who threatened to ruin their excellent relations. Renthe-Fink would not be pacified, and to Frederiksen’s great regret reacted by toning down relations and cancelling the remaining Admira matches, as well as the coming international match against Sweden to be held at Idrætsparken in Copenhagen.

An end was put to the immediate continuation of collaborative sports: developments that included the planned international football match against Germany, set for 29 June 1941, at Idrætsparken, that in any case would have been withdrawn after the German invasion of the Soviet Union on 22 June, all of which resulted in a break in sporting relations until 8 October 1941. Taking his cue from the football disturbances, Renthe-Fink applied pressure onto Prime Minister Stauning and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Scavenius, whereby he was able to dump the Danish Minister of Justice, Harald Pedersen, who had long been a thorn in the side of the occupying body. Sport and politics once again were intertwined.

The article takes its starting point from this momentum in the Danish–German sporting relations and shows the attempt to re-establish business as usual in the following period. The disturbances seen at the Admira match back in June 1941 meant that propaganda value from international matches now mainly had to be reaped in Germany, where the German public could be spurred on with entertainments, and by watching friendly cultural exchanges between the occupiers and the occupied. Hitler approved a resumption of the Reich’s international sporting relations, and so, up until and including January the following year, collaborative sports between Denmark and Germany were once more up and running.

The article attempts to cast doubt on the post-war self-representation of the Danish Sports Federation and Danish Football Federation, whose attitudes to the occupation can be epitomized by the memory in the 1970s of having resisted the German lure to collaborate as they had ‘straight backs’ and were real masterminds of inventing ‘all sorts of excuses to not taking part in collaborative events’. 10

The main questions in this article are, first, how did the German and the Danish sport authorities react in the period after the trouble at the terraces at the ‘Admira incident’? Second, to what degree was amateur sporting exchange with the Axis powers resumed after the forced break? Third, were there any signs of fear that the public would again disturb the sporting exchange between the two neighbouring countries? Fourth, did Danish sporting collaborative relations play a particular role in comparison with other collaborative activities in the cultural fields such as film and theatre? Fifth, why did
sporting activities with Germany finally come to an end, and what was the reaction of the Danish sports leaders to the loss of matches with Germany? Thus the theme embraces the final collaboration on the sporting field during 1941/42.11

Drawing upon archival sources in the Danish Sports Federation, the Danish Football Federation, the Danish Foreign Ministry and the Danish press, including the illegal press and the sports press, this article builds on a broad concept of resistance, involving not solely the willingness to fight, gun in hand, but also the refutation of the occupying power in daily life, through verbal or physical protests, or in demonstrative anti-German signs such as bearing the English colours, listening to the BBC, or by booing and whistling at German ‘heil’ salutes. Cold-shouldering the Germans could be viewed as the beginnings of opposition that would later lead to the resistance movement. The idea of a ‘mental and spiritual immune system’ in the following study attempts to point out a Danish sensibility that rejected involvement with the Germans except by absolute necessity and enforcement.

Trouble in the boxing ring

In Denmark, games continued to be arranged with German participation, and in keeping with their earlier track record the sports association Sparta took an active role. At the large annual all-round games, four of Germany’s best boxers took part, with a special commotion being made about a light-heavyweight bout between Svend Aage Christensen and German star boxer Rudi Pepper, who at that point had only lost one fight in his entire career. Herbert Nürnberg, twice German European Champion, in 1937 and again in 1939, also made the trip to Copenhagen, but as he was in a class of his own it was not possible to find a suitable opponent. Instead, he took on the job of second.12

The games caused a few raised eyebrows among Danish authorities. The matches were to be held on 8 October 1941, but after the Admira disturbances four months earlier, there were still concerns that Danish spectators would again cause trouble for the occupying forces. A large number of police were therefore put on duty around the main sports hall, Idrætshuset, in Copenhagen, around 50 men, who must have been fairly conspicuous.13

The unease developed rapidly during the light-heavyweight bout between the two all-time rivals, tough Rudi Pepper and the left-footer Svend Aage Christensen. Both the police and the boxing authorities must have been given a start when, in the first two rounds, the Danish fighter gave Pepper a battle right to the edge and delivered so many counter punches that the public got wind of a sensation. Pepper’s irritation increased in step with the number of points he fell behind, and in the last round he launched a formidable offensive. The result was that Svend Aage Christensen went down twice from tremendous punches, on both occasions for the count of nine. Rudi Pepper was declared the winner, and for a moment there was ‘the buildup to some truly ugly feeling’ since Svend Aage Christensen had delivered ‘an exceptionally fine performance over the first two rounds and for half of the final round’.14 But the tempers eventually subsided.

On the Danish team, there was only one real favourite. This was Viggo Frederiksen, who was up against Ludwig Petri, whom Frederiksen had beaten once before. Petri, who was first in the ring ‘was welcomed with a huge cheer, which boded well for the course of the evening. But the cheer rose to hurricane force when Viggo Frederiksen climbed through the ropes.’15 The Danish crowd, however, was in for a shock when the German,
after landing a series of straight lefts, unleashed in a split-second ‘a pre-planned and explosive right-hand hook’\textsuperscript{16} that sent the Dane to the floor. Frederiksen, too, was down for the count of nine, and although he could not recover what he had lost ‘the Dane woke and stirred himself, and got back in a fight that had captured the public’, which ‘gave rise to many bursts of applause and helped obscure the weak Danish effort of the earlier rounds’.\textsuperscript{17} In fact, the tournament went so badly for Denmark that before the final heavyweight bout the Danish team had not won a single victory. For the finale, Carlo Nielsen fought Wilson Kohlbrecher, a ‘well-built and clean-fighting boxer’,\textsuperscript{18} whom Nielsen beat on points after a very even fight, the judgement being described afterwards as questionable.

Cheered in this fashion, the Danish public was then treated to a new tournament a few days later. This was held on 19 October, involving the same German boxers, and once again Idrætshuset was sold out.\textsuperscript{19} It was clear that their annoyance about the poor Danish performance during the previous tournament still weighed on the Danish spectators, who conducted themselves with less control this time, perhaps encouraged, too, by a weakened police presence. Quite simply, the public demanded a Danish victory; their demand being pinned firmly on the first Dane in the ring, Frands Zmuda, who was to meet Ludwig Petri. The Danish boxer had decided, presumably, to extract revenge for Petri’s win over Viggo Frederiksen, and he attacked ‘almost unceasing’ his German opponent. Petri – who took countless hard blows, according to the fight report – nevertheless scored most because of the exceptional quality of his counter attacks, but his win was not popular. Already, ‘tempers were flaring up again’ after the first bout, and a ‘long-lasting chorus of whistling’\textsuperscript{20} broke out, which must have raised tensions inside the hall, given fears of a new Admira incident by the Danish and German authorities.

But the organizers were saved by the bell: or perhaps saved by the German team? Miraculously, Willy Jensen won the next bout against Carl Schmidt, which caused the Danish crowd to calm down a little. It was a ‘deserved but not a great victory’, wrote \textit{Idrætsbladet} (10 October 1941), and considering the bad atmosphere it may be possible that the German boxer fell victim to a political game – perhaps along with the German heavyweight Wilhelm Kohlbrecher, at the previous tournament. It might be imagined that the German authorities were willing to surreptitiously step back, should the build up to an incident seem likely. Whatever the speculation, the tournament took a strange turn of events that simply did not match the usual German levels of fitness or the flair of their boxing. Schmidt seemed tired and lacking motivation, and he blatantly did not box a clean fight, making so many bad punches that he managed to incur a warning.\textsuperscript{21} Schmidt’s frustrated, unclean technique becomes understandable if he had been given orders to lose: losing a fight could very well mean a one-way ticket to service on the front.

For this second tournament, the Danish organizers had been able to find an opponent for Herbert Nürnberg, the double European Champion. He won a predictable victory over Birger Petersen from a seaman’s boxing club, Somændenes Idrætsklub, but not with his usual superior style. \textit{Idrætsbladet} believed his fitness level was poor and that he constantly tried to draw out the time. In the second round, Nürnberg used ‘student boxing’ that ‘is often used in long professional fights’,\textsuperscript{22} but it is perhaps more plausible that this normally so supreme boxer had received orders not to use the Danish seaman as a punch bag.
The difficulty in matching the German opponents and at the same time avoiding a sound thrashing can be clearly seen in the fight between Rudi Pepper and Henry Lehmann, in which the Dane ‘grabbed on like a lobster’ and fought so uncleanly that it was nearly ‘comic’. The bout was obviously nothing to write home about, and in the last fight of the evening, an unenthusiastic Wilhelm Kohlbrecher, the German heavyweight, made sure of an anti-climax in a bout that ‘fell a little flat, after the proceeding fight’. One can speculate whether Kohlbrecher was preoccupied with thoughts of his doubtful defeat in the previous tournament, and subsequently had difficulty in summoning enough enthusiasm. All in all, the second boxing tournament ended undramatically, and in that way exerted no influence over going ahead with the third Sparta event that month involving German competitors. These bouts were held on 26 October 1941 in Idrætshuset, in Copenhagen; organized together with the wrestling association and with participation by two German and two Swedish wrestlers.

The Danish home games all went off quietly, but altogether there was a palpable anxiety among the German and Danish organizers, especially over the first sporting tournament held on Danish ground since the resumption of sporting relations. A large police presence had a preventative effect, but at one point during Sparta’s second boxing event there seemed to be an upsurge towards an incident; which shows the extent to which collaborative sports could be a double-edged sword.

### International football in Dresden

After September 1941, when the German authorities again permitted international sporting relations, a lively stream of activities resumed and a number of Danish teams as well as individual competitors travelled to Germany. The most important event was a game played by the Danish national football team on 16 November, in Dresden; but these footballers were not the first team to compete on German soil. At the beginning of November, the Danish national handball team played an international match against Germany, as they had the year before, but this time in Hamburg. Not unexpectedly, the German team won easily, 13–8. According to the Danish Nazi newspaper *Fædrelandet*, up to 10,000 spectators turned up to watch.

The handball match, however, could not compare to the international game in Dresden, which was given the highest priority by both Danish and German sports authorities. The game was to be a return match for the Hamburg game, in other words a replacement for the planned game at Idrætsparken June 1941 that had been cancelled by the German authorities. This would be the last international football match against Germany during the occupation.

Although Alex Friedmann, a Jewish Danish player, had taken part in the Hamburg international and had also played against Sweden on 14 September 1941, he was not part of the squad for Dresden, perhaps because the positions of which country was most passionate about collaborative sports had been switched round, and now it was the German authorities who denied a visa to a Jewish competitor. Friedmann did not play in October 1941, against Sweden, either, but was nevertheless part of the team for the two international matches against Sweden held the following year.

It was not only the Danish press that got excited. An article in the main newspaper of the German Nazi party, *Völkischer Beobachter*, guardedly cautioned against a well-oiled Danish machine, in the same way that the German dailies characterized the Danish squad.
having a team of extremely high quality. Furthermore, the sports writers for the German papers took a keen interest in the question of which players would be in the line-up.\textsuperscript{30} The Danish team played in a stadium filled to capacity by 50,000 spectators, which included groups of Danish workers who had travelled in from several German cities.\textsuperscript{31} The match was to be played on a pitch that was frozen hard, in a biting cold wind, so the Danish players needed to have the studs on their boots cut down. The overall organization of the match was clearly affected by Germany being at war. There were no corner flags and the stadium was not decked out for the occasion, with only four large flags: Germany, Denmark, Sweden and the flag of German Reich Sports. The flag of Sweden was doubtless included because of the Swedish referee, which gave the German authorities an opportunity to underline Nordic–Germanic unity.\textsuperscript{32}

The Danish squad also came to play a role for German military propaganda. The Germans presented the event in a military context. The warm-up was provided by a match between two select teams, from the Luftwaffe and the local garrison in Dresden, which ended in a last-minute victory for the air force. When the 22 international players and the referee lined up in the middle of the pitch, greeted by ‘a lively cheer’\textsuperscript{33} from the crowd, a German military orchestra played King Christian and the two German wartime anthems, which means also the Nazi Horst Wessel.

For the first 20 minutes of the match, the Danes came under heavy attack, and the Danish defender Poul Hansen saved a shot from off the goal line delivered by the well-known German striker Edmund Conen. The Danish team was having trouble getting on top of their game, while the Germans were able to cut through, playing combinations almost as they wished. Perhaps because of the cold, the German spectators had become somewhat quiet. A Danish contingent in the opposite right corner could be heard chanting to one of the Danish forwards ‘Søbirk, Søbirk, with all your might, that’s the stuff old Frits don’t like’.\textsuperscript{34} After a time, play became more even, but in the 38th minute, following a variety of misunderstandings and bad luck among the Danish defence, Hahnemann, the Austrian forward, managed to score.

The second half started off with the Danish players slightly disorientated, as the military orchestra continued playing at full force. It was likewise impossible to hear Ivan Eklind, the referee, blow his whistle when Hahnemann wasted a superb opportunity. But luck was on the Danish side. After 55 minutes, the German keeper made a dreadful error and dropped the ball at the feet of Kai Hansen, who resolutely pounded it into the net between two German defenders. During the remainder of the match, the defences on both sides fought hard. The German team had the most chances, but despite German pressure the match ended a draw.

There was an official post-match dinner held at the hotel, which brought the Danish squad and Danish diplomats together with the German political and military leaders in Dresden. Present were the city mayor, his director, the president of the German Football Federation (DFB), Felix Linnemann, and from the Danish embassy Schøn, the embassy secretary, and Reimer, the ambassador. Speeches were given and the Danes received, ‘special mementoes of the match, various pictures of Dresden, a commemorative glazed tile and some books’. On behalf of the Danes present, Leo Frederiksen gave a speech to the German leaders in which he emphasized that Germans could look forward to ‘an entirely different match’, next year, when they would play in Copenhagen: a match, however, that would never take place.\textsuperscript{35}
In the German press, the focus was naturally placed solely on the game, which they considered to be of high quality and whereby Danish players were praised in a number of sources. In the German special magazine *Der Kicker*, a Dr Nerz announced that the match draw resulted especially from the skilled efforts of the Danish goalkeeper and the two Danish defenders, while the story on the game in the German journal *Kampf* stood out by its glorification in military prose of the German squad, at the same time believing the most brutal players of the match to be the Danes.\(^3\)

There were other places, too, where the Danish efforts were not especially appreciated but for quite different reasons. A summary of a BBC Denmark transmission from November 1941 is kept in the archives of the Danish Foreign Ministry and is testimony for an attack in strong terms on collaborative sports – particularly against the match in Dresden: saying that events such as these could present Danes as pro-German when they dutifully and innocently let themselves be used by the Nazis. The Germans used the match for propaganda purposes, and the Danish national team, therefore, should stay away from tournaments or matches against Nazis ‘of whatever shade’.\(^37\)

There were, nevertheless, serious concerns to be addressed leading up to the coming year’s Nordic football congress in Stockholm, held in February 1942. The Danish Football Association was worried about the prospects of international matches being abandoned. As far as matches against Norway were concerned, there was nothing to be done and matches against Finland would likewise hardly be a prospect. But *Idrætsbladet* could still report that the congress would be attended by ‘a representative or deputation from the German football federation. Last year, as is known, Germany played against Finland, Sweden and Denmark, and they will presumably be taking the opportunity, where representatives from Norway are present, to line up agreements for German international matches with Scandinavian countries for the current year.’\(^38\)

According to the Swedish press, Hungary, too, had entered negotiations with the Nordic countries with a view to organizing a tour of Sweden, Denmark and Norway, with ‘international matches in the respective capital cities’.\(^39\) The Stockholm congress was eventually cancelled, so the Danish Football Association instead invited representatives from the football associations of Germany, Finland and Sweden to a conference in Copenhagen, on Sunday 15 March 1942, to ‘decide fixtures for that year’s international matches between Denmark and the aforementioned countries’.\(^40\) Finland had sent a telegram saying their association member, E. Koskinen, would be attending, which was especially well-received within DBU circles since ‘this message seems to indicate that DBU may well have its ambition fulfilled for an international match against the Finns, in Copenhagen.’ However, ‘because of circumstances’ DBU needed to cancel the Copenhagen conference, but, in the words of Valdemar Laursen, a Danish international referee, ‘Hopefully, the cancellation of the coming conference will not hinder a new conference being convened as soon as possible.’\(^41\) The vice-chairman of DBU also travelled to Germany in May 1942 to negotiate yet another international match, but nothing availed from this approach either.\(^42\)

Danish–German collaboration conducted around international matches continued on German soil with the Dresden game as its flagship. It was German reluctance that made the Dresden game the last international football match played against Germany during the occupation. In contrast, the leadership of Danish football was in full swing with initiatives for international matches; but, as would become apparent, Danish representatives would soon be left with little room for manoeuvre in organizing such events.
The Danish wartime European champion

The on-the-spot reporter for *Idrætsbladet*, its editor, Magnus Simonsen, stayed in Germany after the Dresden game for Denmark’s coming international boxing tournament in less than a week’s time, in Munich. At stake was a competition in which the Danish referee, Aage Kroll, would be participating. Kroll had also been active in Germany 10 days before the tournament, when Germany met Italy in an international match held in Breslau, as well as at a tournament in Stuttgart, where the Italian national team had met a select team of German boxers. From his close knowledge of German elite boxing, Kroll believed that the national Danish team could give the Germans an even fight.43

The Danish boxers were welcomed at an official reception.44 Afterwards, they took part in German war propaganda by laying a wreath at a memorial for soldiers killed in the World War, and they were finally guests at a large reception at the city hall. At the tournament itself, on 22 November 1941, 5,000 spectators turned up at the Krone Circus buildings to a sold-out event. The German boxers had been in Munich for nearly a week, training for their bouts, and despite the war they all seemed to be fit for fight. The three judges were from Germany, Denmark and Sweden. The Swedish referee was Oscar Söderlund, the pro-German Swedish president of the International Boxing Association.

In contrast to the earlier fights in Copenhagen, the Danes were now up against a completely different kind of opposition that did not hesitate in the slightest. It was almost another ‘Breslau catastrophe’ but in boxing rather than football, and the tournament ended in total German victory. But for boxing enthusiasts, there were other developments that were worth reporting in the Danish press.

In place of the cancelled European Championships, the Danish Boxing Association accepted an invitation to the so-called Wartime European Championships held at the Centennial Hall venue in Breslau, in January 1942. Eleven nations and around 100 boxers fought in front of an audience of mostly Germans.45 The event took place under the leadership of the chairman of the International Boxing Association, Oscar Söderlund, while the head of German boxing, Hans Hieronymus, managed to put on a wartime European championships that were every bit as colourful and grandiose as the usual European championships. Besides a contribution from Söderlund, there were speeches given at the opening ceremony by two top Nazi figures, the deputy for the Reichssportführer, Arnold Breitmeyer, and the Nazi head of occupied Silesia, Karl Hahnke, which in best propaganda mode covered the German war effort and the new order of European sport under German leadership.46

Denmark participated with two boxers and the ‘activistic’ head of boxing from the Sparta club, Georg Schmidt.47 The heavyweight, Carl Nielsen, lost his first fight against his Italian opponent after what the Danes believed was a questionable verdict. On the other hand, Svend Aage Christensen, with his technical competence and wider repertoire, also from Sparta, could return home as the new light-heavyweight wartime European champion. However, his victory is partially attributable to the weakened opposition at this point in the war. In fact, Denmark had failed to achieve European championship medals at the previous three European championships, and only took part in the world championships in Milan in 1937, in which only one of the five Danish boxers to compete won a single fight.48
The Danish camp was already aggrieved that Svend Aage Christensen had to meet Rudi Pepper in the semi-finals, who not so many months earlier had won an easy victory on points at Idrætshuset, in which he had twice sent the Dane to the floor. But this time, apparently, Svend Aage Christensen had done his homework. In the first two rounds, Pepper opened up with a moderate tempo, while the Sparta boxers took a defensive position, replying with counter punches. In the third round, Svend Aage Christensen went more on the offensive and in the end brought home a victory, despite a warning for having bent over too low during the bout. The result was the cause of a fierce chorus of whistling around the Centennial Hall. In the final, Svend Aage Christensen fought against Otto Profitlich, whom he beat on points. To put it mildly, the German press was unimpressed by Christensen, who nevertheless received a handsome championship belt together with a bronze statuette of a boxer that, according to the Danish newspaper Berlingske Tidende, was Breslau’s trophy of honour for excellent boxing. Was Christensen’s dubious victory an expression of political appreciation for a small occupied country that sent competitors to Axis-power games?

What can be referred to with certainty is a ‘wartime European championships’ with low levels of competition. Apart from boxers from Axis-power nations, there were only Danish and Swedish competitors who achieved first-place results among the winning nations’ boxers. In the national competitions, Germany came first, followed by Italy, Sweden and Hungary in a tied third place, and then Denmark and Spain. Sweden’s K. G. Norén took the middleweight title.

As for the attitude of the boxing association, it is revealing that a Danish referee named Marius Sick, who had been interred by the Germans in October 1942, had the return of his licence refused by the Danish Boxing Association committee because the boxing association did not wish to appear to be provocative. Later that year, however, Sick did manage to regain his licence, but the association recommended to their clubs that he be used as little as possible.

Matches against Italy and Hungary

Very gradually, the war effort began to take its toll on the sports-loving German nation. In 1939, German teams took part in 106 different sporting events, competing against 19 countries; the level falling in the first year of the war to around half; and in 1942 German teams took part in 51 events against just 9 other countries. The remaining Axis-alliance countries were also becoming too involved in the war to be able to spare much time for sporting relations with Denmark, apart from the one handball match against Hungary in November 1942. All in all, Germany was so involved in war action that sporting activities began to seem an unnecessary luxury.

The flagging interest of the occupying power was expressed in a communication to the collected Danish sports associations, from 24 January 1942, in which Sander wrote that DIF and the German legation had agreed to limit the extent of Danish–German sporting relations because of ‘the current difficult situation that reigns’. Collaborative sports should be restricted to matches in which DIF had a special interest ‘in seeing Danish colours represented’. Put briefly, more control over collaborative sports was needed so that the German authorities would not feel provoked by activities such as a lively traffic in sport between Denmark and Sweden.
Despite dwindling German interests, DBU (as late as March 1942) tried to place a call for attendance by Sweden, Finland and Germany to a conference that would settle the forthcoming season’s international matches, and in May 1942 the DIF vice-chairman, the same Leo Frederiksen, travelled to Germany to negotiate yet another international match. As it had become too dangerous to arrange international matches played in Denmark against the occupying forces, DIF needed to turn its attentions to other Axis powers. The Danish Tennis Federation (DTF) therefore organized an international match against Italy at the indoor tennis courts of the ball-sports club B.93, at Osterbro in Copenhagen, for 30 and 31 November 1941. There was much anxiety over whether the Danish players would be able to compete, since at the last international match in KB-Hallen in 1939, Italy had won all nine matches of the tournament. And in the middle of the War, Italy was still one of Europe’s strongest tennis nations. Danish hopes were founded on the Italian team’s lack of experience at indoor tennis. The Danes had only recently lost a tennis tournament to Sweden, but then so had the Italians. Denmark lost the tournament 6–0, and a short time afterwards lost again to Sweden, 5–0.55

Although sporting relations with Germany were grinding to a halt, there were still opportunities for representatives from Axis-alliance countries to compete in Denmark. In March 1942, Denmark’s largest tennis club, Hellerup Idrætsklub (HIK), reached an agreement with the Croatian tennis players Pallada and Mitic to play exhibition matches at the HIK indoor courts at Hartmannsvej, in Copenhagen. The tennis hall had a capacity of up to 2,000 and was often used for international matches. Every evening, three matches would be played, in which the Croatians would compete against HIK’s best players, which included Helge Plougmann, Aage Seier Hansen, Per Thielsen and Jannik Ipsen.56

As late as 20 November 1942, a Danish national handball team played against Hungary in Copenhagen, and lost narrowly by 13–12. In this way, the activistic Danish Handball Association hold the questionable honour of playing the last national match against a team from the Axis powers during the occupation. On the front cover of *Idrætsbladet*, the text and images showed ‘When Hungary won the international handball match in the very last seconds’.57

The Danish team had led three to four minutes before the final whistle from Åke Thorsen, the Swedish referee. Nevertheless, *Idrætsbladet* chose to see the positive side of the situation, since it had been ‘an especially brilliant game. Certainly, it had been a tough match, as the Hungarian didn’t mind so much as to what methods they used to stop the Danish attack. But there was tension and excitement in the game, so field handball has surely gained a lot of new supporters since Wednesday’.58

Other cultural collaboration
To understand the particular role that sporting collaborative relations played in Danish cultural collaboration, comparisons can be drawn to other collaborative activities in the cultural fields. In the summer of 1940, the German authorities embarked upon fundamental cultural propaganda. The aim was to win Danes over to the Nazi project, which was undertaken through the German propaganda ‘friendship’ organization for the region, Nordische Gesellschaft, which organized exhibitions, concerts and other cultural events. Even the German chamber of commerce exerted itself in this area. Items were sent such as German films and weekly reviews for the cinema, and the Wehrmacht was only too
happy to contribute with parades and live military music. There was only one problem with this kind of cultural propaganda, however, and that was – in contrast to sport – its one-way communication never being met with much enthusiasm or active response from the Danish people. Furthermore, cultural policy towards Denmark was weakened because the German authorities were involved in internal power struggles, resulting, in part, in the German Foreign Ministry trying to prevent Nordische Gesellschaft in their attempts to win over Danish culturally conservative groups to the German point of view.

To make the Danish–German front more tractable and get a genuine collaboration underway, the Danish Foreign Ministry formed a Danish–German society, the Dansk–Tysk Forening, on 24 June 1940. The society worked together with Nordische Verbindungsstelle, which was financed by the German Ministry of Propaganda. The idea was to ensure contact between the occupying forces and the Danish cultural elite. For the occupying authorities, the society was a nest from which to hatch a pro-German leading circle in Denmark. The aim was never achieved, however, as the approximately 1,400 members were not quite prepared to take on the role. With the exception of the mainland town Aarhus, the Danish–German society never managed to gain prominence in the provinces.59

The Dansk–Tysk Forening, Dansk–Europæisk Selskab, Nordische Gesellschaft and Nordische Verbindungsstelle, together with German institutions in Copenhagen, became the collective centre for appeals to the Danish cultural elite, and that only with limited success. German-oriented radio talks, too, were no great success, since neither the Foreign Ministry nor the German authorities could get prominent figures to create an understanding between the two represented peoples.60

Beyond these activities, attention was turned to a number of established Danish cultural institutions. The Royal Danish Theatre had toured internationally only very rarely in the 1930s, so it is much more notable that Danish ballet and theatre troupes visited Germany on a total of four occasions from 1937 to 1939. Towards the end of the 1930s – due to the impact of increasing self-censorship of criticism towards Nazi Germany in the Danish media – there was only subdued protest against these guest performances. The time was over when a writer like the famous Kjeld Abell, in the January catalogue from the artists’ union Gronningen, could explicitly warn against participation by Danish artists in the ‘artists’ Olympiad’, which was a special feature of the Berlin 1936 Olympics. The theatre publication Forum, for example, stopped using articles that were critical of Germany, such as accounts of attempts by German Jewish theatre people to escape the Aryanized Reich. The tour invitations came from Germany and were strongly encouraged by the Danish Ministry of Education, who spotted an easy way to build up goodwill with the Nazi authorities through such guest performances.

In contrast to their sporting counterparts, the Royal Danish Theatre – with a few exceptions – had not actively gone in for cultural exchange with their larger southern neighbours throughout the 1930s, and a certain resistance can even be detected against such events. In 1938, a section chief of the Ministry of Education, Cai Hegermann-Lindencrone, took over the position of theatre director and he was forced to allow the last of the guest performances to go on, performed in Berlin, in May 1939. However, he refused another invitation later that year, without hesitation, on the grounds that the theatre could not perform in a country at war. The most important feature when making comparisons with sport is that Hegermann-Lindencrone consistently rejected invitations for Danish guest productions in Germany during the occupation whenever the
opportunity arose, and in a way that was never especially diplomatic. This attitude was reflected among the artists and players. At a Copenhagen guest performance of a work by the Nazi cult author Heinrich George, in May 1941, the Danish actress Bodil Ipsen and several others refused point-blank to attend a luncheon, organized by the Royal Danish Theatre and the foreign and education ministries. This historical comparison would not be complete, however, if it were not emphasized that Danish theatre was never exposed to the same onslaught from the Nazi authorities as sport had been; doubtless because sport appealed to a ‘mass public’ to a far greater degree.

For the German authorities, propaganda was of utmost importance. It meant that mass media such as film and public sports were areas of special interest. In the world of film, though, the German authorities met with strong Danish resistance. Heavy German pressure had been applied to Danish cinema owners to show more German films and to have the German weekly reviews shown more frequently as part of the cinema programme. Despite this, the net results for 19 Copenhagen cinemas in 1941 show that American and Danish films took up 30% of the collected Copenhagen film market, while German films, much to the regret of the Wehrmacht, comprised only 13%.

Although the German authorities eventually managed to increase the screenings of German films and the frequency of the German weekly reviews, either through economic incitements or through direct enforcement, it did not lead to any great enthusiasm among the Danish public. On the contrary, on several occasions disturbances were seen at the weekly reviews, as well as demonstrative applause when features such as American films began. There were German successes in influencing film culture, however, when Danes flocked in large numbers to see German films such as Veit Harlan’s *Die Goldene Stadt* (1942).

Over the course of the occupation, it became increasingly obvious that young Danes were more interested in American jazz and swing music than in German films and literature, which led to the summary bombings or destruction of relevant Danish entertainment spots, instigated by German Nazi stooge groups such as Schalburgkorpset.

The Danish public proved to be not very receptive to Nazi propaganda, whether it came served in Nazi periodicals or at outdoor concerts, which, incidentally, were a contributing factor to the sudden enthusiasm for Danish communal singing in venues around the country. The Danish cinema owners were put under enormous pressure, with reprisals taken by the occupying forces, but many German films and reviews of the week were simply too propagandist for Danish tastes. Much indicates, then, that the Danish sports leadership could have commanded a greater share of the decision-making—in a way managed by organizers such as the cinema owners—if they had been willing to accept a measure of conflict with the occupying forces along the way and accept exposure to reprisals.

With the continuity of sport’s internal forms, where the rules and the play on the pitch were themselves left untouched, sport had a much stronger grasp on the public, despite its being framed with ‘heil’ salutes and swastikas and with the presence of German soldiers among the crowd. Sport became the sole area of Danish culture in which Danish–German collaboration for a period experienced a major breakthrough to the delight of crowds both in Denmark and Germany. Through the images in press of athletes and their spontaneous bodily collaboration, it can be seen at a grass-roots level how sport offered a unique opportunity for the occupiers and the occupied to meet over common
emotional experiences. But, often, the pictures of Danish and German athletes in close contact were clearly stage-managed with one eye on propaganda goals.

Conclusion
Danish research into collaboration policy during the occupation until now has focused especially on opinion-makers and leaders in sports and economics. The current article, however, has aimed to uncover Danish–German relations at grass-roots level. Collaborative activities were not the filtered-down results of efforts by the top political circles to achieve goodwill with the occupying forces, encapsulated in initiatives such as the Danish–German Association, but rather in the field of sport were an expression of an independent interest shown by the Danish organizers for preserving relations with Germany and other Axis powers. Consequently, the article demonstrates that both the Danes and the Germans used sport as cultural propaganda during the early phases of the German occupation of Denmark. Through sport the Danes showed the Germans that the politics of collaboration was running smoothly, and at the same time that Danes cared about their motherland symbolized by flags, songs and strong emotional identification with their national teams and athletes. The sport exchange, on the other hand, gave the occupying power the possibility to show a friendly face of fair play and vitalist celebration of the athletic body to the Danes.

After the enforced break due to the riots of the Admira match in June 1941, the Danish and German authorities were so concerned about the events of the Admira game being repeated that around 50 security officers were brought in for a boxing tournament in Copenhagen on 8 October 1941, which was the first competition in resumed collaborative sports to be held on Danish ground. However, Danish–German sporting relations got underway again, even with national team matches going on in Germany and matches with other Axis-power countries. Most notable was an international soccer match in Dresden in November 1941 that ended with a 1–1 draw.

Banners of the Nazi swastika flew side-by-side with the Danish flag, Dannebrog, while German competitors gave the ‘heil’ salute and German spectators gave the ‘heil’ in return, and the Danish crowd sang Danish anthems such as Kong Christian Stod ved Højen Mast and the German crowd Deutschland, Deutschland über Alles, followed in Germany by the Nazi Horst Wessel anthem. And all this happened while other countries were in a desperate military fight for survival.

Of all the arenas for cultural–political collaboration with Denmark, the German authorities came close to pulling off a major coup through sport. The institutional frames were in place well before the occupation, both on formal and informal levels. In contrast to other German initiatives, sporting collaboration was directed towards the masses and could thereby influence broad opinion. In the area of cinema, too, the German powers had a number of successes. But in contrast to relations with the leadership of Danish sports, German relations with Danish cinema proprietors were marked by conflict and German interventions, while the Danish cinema public, unlike sports enthusiasts, were passive recipients of cultural messages and not active competitors and fans.

In contrast to other occupied countries such as Holland and Norway, the sporting life of the Danish ‘peace occupation’ was flourishing. In Norway, a Sporting Front took the initiative for a boycott amongst Norwegian sportspeople that lasted from November 1940 until the end of the occupation in 1945 and became one of the biggest victories for
the popular resistance in Norway. Danish reactions to Nazi Germany during the initial phases of the war resemble that of neutral Sweden. The Swedish–Danish wartime sport collaboration might be seen as politically neutral or even as an expression of national and Nordic feelings of independence. Though these feelings certainly were present, it must be emphasized that the cooperation was triangular as it included Germany. The three nations coordinated their match schedules; they exchanged referees and used the results of the matches of the other nations in a constant measuring of actual sport ranking in football, as well as in other sports such as handball and boxing.

Gradually, as Germany began running into military difficulties, there was less and less interest, in the words of propaganda minister Goebbels, of seeing Germans losing to weaker nations. It was therefore German and not Danish authorities who began reducing collaborative sports levels from the beginning of 1942, which for a second time led to the cancellation of a planned international football match on Danish ground.

The ideology of DIF to not mix sport and politics was deployed to legitimize the most comprehensive politicization of Danish sport ever, and resulted in the most notable example of cultural collaboration with the occupying power. It is an irony of fate that DIF was in fact far too apolitical to prevent the German power’s cynical use of Danish sport for the purposes of its propaganda.

Notes

1 Unless otherwise mentioned this introduction is based on Bonde, *Football with the Foe*, 14 ff.
3 Anderson, *Imagined Communities*.
4 Cf. Beck, *Scoring for Britain*.
5 Two of the latest are Lidegaard, *Kampen om Danmark*, and Bundgaard–Christensen et al., *Danmark besat*.
6 There have been few serious attempts to understand the role of the Danish Sports Federation (DIF) during the occupation. Steen Rasmussen’s central and pioneering work from the University of Copenhagen, ‘Dansk Idræts Forbund 1940–45 – Med specielt henblik på forholdet til Tyskland’ [The Danish Sports Federation 1940–45 – with particular interest in relations with Germany 1940–45], from 1981 has only been published as an article in the sports yearbook *Idræthistorisk Årbog*, 1985. In 2004, Martin Frei submitted his masters degree thesis, ‘Idræt og politik under besættelsen’, on the role of DIF during the occupation at Roskilde University with Claus Bryld and Hans Bonde as supervisors. In 2006 the author published a monograph on the subject *Fodbold med fjenden* that in 2008 was published in English with the title *Football with the Foe*. The authors’ original Danish book on the topic has been transformed into both a film documentary shown in April 2008 on Danish state television (DR2) and into a museum exhibition shown in 2008 in Odense and in Copenhagen.
8 Kuper, *Ajax, the Dutch, the War*, 93, 97.
9 E-mail, 5 June 2009, from Niels Gyrsting to the author.
10 See the quotation at the beginning of the article and Bonde, *Football with the Foe*, 225–9.
11 The article mainly focuses on the Danish reactions to the German–Danish sport exchange, though a future investigation of the German reaction to the exchange
with Denmark – not least the German press coverage – could be highly interesting. For the German reactions in a broad international context see, for example, Teichler, *Internationale Sportpolitik*.

12 *Idrætsbladet*, 19 August 1941, front cover, together with 10 October 1941.
13 *Idrætsbladet*, 26 September 1941, 10.
14 *Idrætsbladet*, 10 October 1941, 8.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
19 *Spartaneren*, no. 11, November 1941, 4; cf. also *Idrætsbladet*, 14 October 1941.
20 *Idrætsbladet*, 21 October 1941, 6
21 *Idrætsbladet*, 10 October 1941.
22 *Idrætsbladet*, 21 October 1941, 6.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
25 *Spartaneren*, no. 10, October 1941; *Idrætsbladet*, 24 October 1941.
26 *Idrætsbladet*, 7 November 1941.
27 *Fædrelandet*, 3 November 1941.
28 DBU (Archives of the Danish Football Association, Danish National Archives in Copenhagen), Pakke 17.
29 B 1903 official website at http://www.b1903.dk
30 *Idrætsbladet*, 14 November 1941; *Idrætsbladet*, 18 November 1941.
31 Around 100 Danish workers had travelled from Leipzig, Berlin and several other German cities. Many Danes missed out on tickets to the sold-out match, and during the build-up to the game contact was taken up between players and Danish guest workers in Germany trying to buy tickets. *Idrætsbladet*, 18 November 1941.
32 *Fædrelandet*, 17 November 1941.
33 *Idrætsbladet*, 18 November 1941.
34 Ibid.
35 *Idrætsbladet*, 11 November 1941; *Idrætsbladet*, 14 November 1941; *Idrætsbladet*, 18 November 1941.
36 *Idrætsbladet*, 21 November 1941.
37 UM (Archives of the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Danish National Archives in Copenhagen), 84.C.15, ‘Udenlandsk radio og ikke-offentliggjort nyhedsstof’, resumé, 18 November 1941.
38 *Idrætsbladet*, 20 January 1942, 3.
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
41 *Idrætsbladet*, 17 March 1942, 12.
42 DBU (Archives of the Danish Football Association, Danish National Archives in Copenhagen), Pakke 113, DBUs Officielle Meddelelser, 31 May 1942, referat af forrentningsudvalgs møde 9 May 1942.
43 *Idrætsbladet*, 24 October 1941, 15; *Idrætsbladet*, 4 November 1941, 1.
44 *Idrætsbladet*, 25 November 1941.
45 *Fædrelandet*, 15 January 1942; Berlingske Tidende, 23 January 1942. The evidence suggests there were around 5,000 spectators present.
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